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Abstract
In this study, we investigate whether female managers contribute to greater gender equality in organi-
zations. Specifically, we examine whether women’s and men’s earnings are affected by the share of
female managers in their organization, and by being supervised by a female manager. We formulate
opposing hypotheses arguing that women are either change agents who reduce gender inequality in
earnings in their organization, or cogs in the machine who do not influence or even enlarge gender in-
equality in earnings. We employ unique manager-employee linked data from nine countries to test
these hypotheses. Results are in line with the weak version of the women as cogs in the machine
hypothesis: women’s and men’s earnings are not affected by the share of female managers in their or-
ganization, nor by being supervised by a female manager. Gender equality in earnings is thus not
stimulated by female managerial representation. Between-country variations in results are discussed.
Introduction
The past decades have seen a steady increase in women’s
representation in all levels of management (Jacobs,
1992; Bygren and Ga¨hler, 2012). Women’s access to
management has been the subject of many studies which
have led to imperative insights on how gender inequality
in access to power is established (Smith, 2002). Now
that women increasingly occupy managerial positions,
the question arises what the implications of the growing
number of women in these positions might be
(Huffman, 2016). Managers play a key role in organiza-
tions and decide on the hiring, wages, promotions, and
training of employees (Huffman, 2013). As such, a
change in the demographic representation of managers
may affect inequalities among employees. Today, gender
inequality in earnings is still one of the most pronounced
and visible forms of gender inequality in organizations
(Reskin, 2000; Cha and Weeden, 2014; Blau, 2016).
Abundant studies have investigated explanations for the
gender gap in earnings, but only a small proportion has
concentrated on the influence of women’s representation
in management (Abendroth et al., 2017). This contribu-
tion relates these two phenomena and focuses on the
implications of female representation in managerial
positions for gender inequality in earnings.
Existing studies propose opposing hypotheses regard-
ing the influence of female managers on gender equality
in organizations (Cohen and Huffman, 2007;
Abendroth et al., 2017). On the one hand, female man-
agers may function as ‘agents of change’ who actively
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foster gender equality in the workplace (Huffman,
2013). This hypothesis is rooted in Kanter’s (1977) ob-
servation that the unequal representation of women and
men in positions of power in organizations is related to
processes producing workplace inequality. On the other
hand, scholars argue that female managers act as ‘cogs
in the machine’, lacking either the power or the will to
actively stimulate gender equality in the workplace
(Cohen and Huffman, 2007).
Previous studies have yielded contradictory results,
partly depending on the type of data used (Huffman,
2016). First, some studies relied on data at the organiza-
tional level to test the aforementioned hypotheses. These
cross-sectional (Shenhav and Haberfeld, 1992; Cohen
and Huffman, 2007) and longitudinal (Baron et al.,
1991; Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer, 2010; Kurtulus and
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012) studies reported smaller gen-
der inequalities in earnings and advancements opportu-
nities in organizations with a high proportion of female
managers, thus lending support to the ‘agents of change’
hypothesis. Second, due to the limited availability of ap-
propriate data, a far smaller number of studies used data
on individual employees and their managers, which
allowed them to directly assess whether female employ-
ees benefit from being supervised by a female manager.
These studies overall reported results more in line with
the ‘cogs in the machine’ hypothesis. For example,
employing cross-sectional data with direct manager-
employee links on a large sample of organizations,
Abendroth et al. (2017) studied implications of both an
organization’s managerial composition and the sex of
employees’ direct manager. Interestingly, they found
that gender wage gaps were lower for low qualified jobs
in organizations with a high proportion of female man-
agers but, in general, the earnings of female employees
did not benefit from having a female manager. Maume
and Ruppanner (2015) found that women do not earn
more when they report to a female as opposed to a male
supervisor. Penner et al. (2012) and Srivastava and
Sherman (2015) assessed longitudinal data with direct
manager-employee links from a single organization
from the United States and also found that women’s
earnings are not positively influenced by being super-
vised by a female manager.
Studies employing individual-level data are limited in
some respects. Of the cross-sectional studies, Abendroth
et al. (2017) only assessed large German firms (>500
employees) and Maume and Ruppanner (2015) used em-
ployee reported data which limited them in controlling
for organization characteristics, such as its proportion
of female managers. The longitudinal studies by Penner
et al. (2012) and Srivastava and Sherman (2015) only
assessed one firm and therefore the question remains
how generalizable the results of these studies are to
other organizations. Except for Abendroth et al. (2017),
all studies assessed data from the United States. Previous
studies that used organizational-level data were fore-
most limited in that they did not establish whether
women in fact worked for a female manager. Huffman
(2016: p. 184) underscores the importance of assessing
direct manager-employee links because they: ‘allow us
to more confidently link the actions and decisions of
those in managerial positions to patterns of inequality
among their supervisees’. Indeed, female managers may
directly advance or impede the earnings of same-sex sub-
ordinates within their discretionary HR policy space.
However, female managers can also influence women’s
earnings through various indirect mechanisms, e.g. their
support for gender equality enhancing policies in the or-
ganization. So, female managers may improve the earnings
of women working directly underneath them, but also the
earnings of other women in the organization. To thor-
oughly assess whether female managers contribute to gen-
der equality in organizations, it is therefore desirable to
study simultaneously whether women’s and men’s earn-
ings are affected by the gender composition of managers
in their organization and the sex of their own manager.
Data to properly assess whether female managers
contribute to gender equality in organizations is thus
very rare. Huffman (2016) in this respect stressed that
new data-collection efforts need to be made, and
that appropriate data most importantly include direct
manager-employee links, but ideally also cover charac-
teristics of employees, their managers and the organiza-
tions for which they work. This study contributes the
European Sustainable Workforce Survey (hereafter
ESWS): a unique, recently collected cross-national three-
level dataset that holds information about employees,
their department managers and the organizations for
which they work, allowing us to optimally test the influ-
ence of female managers on gender equality in the
organization in a wide range of contexts (van der Lippe
et al., 2016). First, the ESWS data allow us to directly
connect employees to their managers. As one of the few,
we can directly assess whether earnings of female and
male employees are differently affected by reporting to a
female or male manager and by the proportion of female
managers in their organization (Maume and Ruppanner,
2015; Abendroth et al., 2017). Second, the ESWS data
contain elaborate information about employees, their
managers and the organizations in which employees and
managers are embedded. As a result, we can account for
variation and characteristics on different levels. Third,
the ESWS data cover organizations from various sizes,
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six sectors and nine countries and therefore allow us to
assess whether female managers advance the earnings of
women in a wide variety of organizations in several
countries. Testing the aforementioned hypotheses in a
wide range of contexts is important, since social con-
texts most likely matter for the influence female manag-
ers have on gender inequality in organizations (Maume
and Ruppanner, 2015). Most importantly, whereas both
prior individual- and organizational-level studies mostly
employed data from the United States, we test the afore-
mentioned hypotheses in the European context.
Interestingly, in one of the very few European studies,
Abendroth et al. (2017) found for Germany that the pro-
portion of female managers only reduces the gender pay
gap in low qualified jobs whereas earlier studies from
the United States found a more univocal alleviating ef-
fect of female managers on the gender pay gap in organi-
zations. In this study we are able to check for variation
in results between countries, sectors and different types
of organizations and employees.
The first goal of this article is to examine the associ-
ation between the share of female managers in the organ-
ization and women’s and men’s earnings. Its second goal
is to examine whether the earnings of female and male
employees are affected by reporting to a female or a male
manager. If these conditions affect women’s and men’s
earnings differently, they influence the gender gap in earn-
ings. Accordingly, we formulate hypotheses on both the
organizational- and individual level. In line with previous
studies on this topic, we formulate contrasting hypotheses
stating that female managers are either agents of change
or cogs in the machine (Maume, 2011). We employ
(cross-level) interactions to test our hypotheses.
Theoretical Framework
Agents of Change
There are several reasons why female managers might im-
prove the earnings of female employees. First, female
managers, as do male managers, have the tendency of
homophily (Kanter, 1977; McPherson et al., 2001; Elliott
and Smith, 2004). Kanter (1977) theorizes that manager-
ial positions are characterized by a high level of uncer-
tainty, and that the need for trust, discretion, and clear-
cut communication between actors is for that reason
more important on managerial levels. As do other people,
managers rely on social bases for trust because people
that are more similar to them are more likely to share the
same values, preferences, and ‘speak the same language’
(Kanter, 1977). Sex is a key characteristic based on which
people make social distinctions, so people expect same-
sex peers to be more similar to them (England, 2010). So,
managers likely expect less difficulties working with
same-sex employees and, hence, are more likely to sup-
port the careers of same-sex subordinates and assign
them to positions directly underneath them (Elliott and
Smith, 2004). While Kanter (1977) used this argument to
explain why men’s opportunities are superior to wom-
en’s, the mechanism of homosocial reproduction might
benefit women when a female manager is in power
(Maume, 2011; Srivastava and Sherman, 2015). Hence,
female managers might particularly stimulate the careers
of female subordinates, invoking mechanisms that stimu-
late their earnings. Studies have indeed shown that if a
subordinate has the same sex, managers are more likely
to mentor and befriend them (McPherson et al., 2001;
Ehrich and Kimber, 2015). This would give women more
access to beneficiary organizational networks improving
their careers and earnings if they have a female manager.
In addition, research has demonstrated that subordinates
are evaluated better by a manager of the same sex
(Castilla, 2011). This could be due to subordinates per-
forming better under a same-sex manager, but also to
managers having a preference for same-sex subordinates
due to mechanisms of homophily. Performance evalua-
tions are, evidently, correlated with promotions and earn-
ings (Lyness and Heilman, 2006).
Second, female managers might enhance earnings of
their female subordinates because they are more able to
sympathize with and willing to support other women be-
cause of shared experiences with sex-based discrimin-
ation (Maume, 2011). Research has shown that women
who became mothers are perceived less competent and
less favorable candidates for being hired, promoted, or
educated (Cuddy et al., 2004). Due to their own experi-
ences, female managers might be more aware of this
form of discrimination and even be more motivated to
negate the negative effects of pregnancy on the career
prospects and earnings of their female subordinates.
Halpert et al. (1993) indeed demonstrate that women’s
performance evaluations of pregnant employees are less
biased than men’s. In addition, female managers are also
more familiar with the work-family conflicts of their fe-
male subordinates than male managers. Linehan and
Walsh (2000) showed that female managers did the ma-
jority of childcare and household tasks, irrespective of
their working hours. As a result, female managers may
be more understanding and flexible when their female
subordinates have work-family conflicts. Abendroth and
den Dulk (2011) show that workplace support for
work-life balance positively impacts employees’ work-
life balance satisfaction. Butts et al. (2013) have shown
that employees with fewer work-family conflicts are
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more satisfied with and committed to their job which, in
turn, could benefit their career prospects and earnings.
The previous two mechanisms specifically explain
why female managers might directly enhance the earn-
ings of their female subordinates. In addition, the sup-
port of female managers for gender equality enhancing
policies in organizations possibly benefits the earnings
of all women in an organization; even for women who
do not have a female manager themselves. Cohen and
Huffman (2007) demonstrated that female managers are
more in favor of gender equality enhancing policies than
male managers. They showed that in the 1996 wave of
the General Social Survey, female managers were 1.32
more likely than male managers to agree with the state-
ment ‘Because of past discrimination, employers should
make special efforts to hire and promote qualified
women’. Female managers may be stronger advocates of
gender equality enhancing policies because they are
more familiar with sex-based discrimination, but it may
also be in their own interest to actively pursue the imple-
mentation of such policies in an organization. If organi-
zations with more female managers more often adopt
policies that stimulate the hiring and promotion of
qualified women, then female employees in these organi-
zations should be more often found in higher ranked
and better paid positions. Research on whether female
managers indeed contribute to the implementation of
gender equality enhancing policies is limited (Huffman,
2016). Dobbin et al. (2011) show that the share of fe-
male managers in organizations is positively related to
the implementation of diversity policies. In combination
with the finding that female managers agree more with
the statement that organizations should make efforts to
hire and promote qualified women, this signals that fe-
male managers are stronger advocates for such policies
than their male colleagues (Cohen and Huffman, 2007).
All in all, this mechanism explains why the proportion
of female managers in an organization might positively
relate to women’s earnings in an organization.
A fourth mechanism that explains why women earn
more when the share of female managers in an organiza-
tion is higher relates to social cognition with respect to
sex (Ely, 1995; Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012).
Studies have shown that employers view female employ-
ees as less capable, ambitious and devoted as men
(Ridgeway, 2001; Acker, 2006). Research has frequently
found indications that these stereotypes hinder women
in obtaining high paid positions in organizations
(Heilman, 2012). The presence of women in managerial
positions in the organization may, however, challenge
stereotypes about women’s ambition and capability. Ely
(1995), for example, shows that sex roles are less
stereotypical in firms with a higher proportion of
women in management. In addition, the presence of fe-
male managers might also challenge the specific stereo-
typical image of how a leader (manager) looks like. As a
result, women might more often advance to positions
with authority in organizations where women are well
represented in management. Smith (2002) argues that
job authority is a workplace resource and highly associ-
ated with income. Importantly, this mechanism not only
applies to the earnings of women working for a female
manager, but to the earnings of all women in an
organization.
In sum, this combination of research currents under-
pins the ‘women as change agents’ proposition. It expects
that the representation of female managers positively
relates to the earnings of all women in an organization
due to their support for gender equality enhancing poli-
cies and mechanisms of social cognition with regard to
sex. Based on mechanisms of homosocial reproduction
and higher levels of support due to shared experiences
with sex-based discrimination, we expect that female
managers positively affect the earnings of their direct
female subordinates. Since some of these proposed mech-
anisms point to opposite effects for men, we specify the
‘change agent’ hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Women’s earnings are positively related
to the proportion of female managers in an organiza-
tion, men’s earnings are negatively related to the propor-
tion of female managers in an organization
Hypothesis 2a: Women’s earnings are positively related
to having a female manager compared to a male man-
ager, men’s earnings are positively related to having a
male manager compared to a female manager
Cogs in the Machine
There are, however, also reasons to expect that female
managers lack the power or do not have the motivation
to enhance the earnings of other women in the organiza-
tion. We describe three main mechanisms that lead to a
weak and a strong version of the cogs in the machine hy-
pothesis. First, female managers may not have sufficient
power to significantly influence the earnings of other
women in the organization (Cohen and Huffman,
2007). This refers to both their position in the organiza-
tion and their executive power as managers. Maume
and Ruppanner (2015) argue that female managers are
often stuck at lower levels of management where they
do not have enough power to substantially affect the
careers of employees. In addition, lower-level managers
have little influence on organizational-level policies
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compared to managers in senior positions. Furthermore,
Charles and Grusky (2004) showed that the increase in
women’s representation in management since the 1970’s
has coincided with increasing organizational bureaucrat-
ization. Due to increasing adherence to procedures, the
influence of managers in an organization has become
restricted, especially that of low-level managers, which
hampers the possibilities of female managers to improve
the earnings of their female subordinates. Jacobs (1992)
argued that managers often have the title of manager
but not the executive power it suggests and that, since
women are more often found in low and middle man-
agement, this is more true for female managers than for
male managers. Female managers may thus want to
stimulate the careers and earnings of other women
including their female subordinates, but they may simply
lack the power to make a substantial difference (Cohen
and Huffman, 2007; Maume, 2011). This argumenta-
tion leads to what we call here the ‘weak’ version of the
cogs in the machine hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: Women’s and men’s earnings are unre-
lated to the proportion of female managers in an
organization
Hypothesis 2b: Women’s and men’s earnings are unre-
lated to the sex of their manager
The ‘strong’ version of the hypotheses goes one step fur-
ther, suggesting that female managers may not want to
actively contribute to gender equality in earnings.
Again, several mechanisms may be at play. First, it has
been argued that only women who accept the organiza-
tional status quo are selected into (senior) management
roles (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Huffman, 2016). If
acceptance of an organization’s existing structure and
culture is one of the—implicit, but salient—selection cri-
teria based on which individuals are selected into (high)
management, female managers’ commitment to gender
equality is expected to be low and by implication wom-
en’s earnings will not improve. Second, ‘queen bee’ the-
ory asserts that women in leadership positions have to
distance themselves from feminine issues in order to jus-
tify and secure their position (Ely, 1995; Kanter, 1977;
Ridgeway, 2001). Actively and openly enhancing the
careers and earnings of their female subordinates would
jeopardize female managers’ position because it raises
the suspicion of female solidarity. Moreover, according
to queen bee theory, women in leadership positions even
legitimize gender inequality and actively oppose initia-
tives to tackle gender inequality in the organization
(Derks et al., 2016). In line with this argument, Maume
(2011) indeed showed, assessing direct employee-
manager dyads, that men experience more job-related
support from a female manager than a male manager.
Third, research has shown that both women and
men subscribe to gender stereotypes (Derks et al., 2011).
As stated earlier, stereotypes hold that female employees
are less devoted and capable employees than men
(Ridgeway, 2001; Acker, 2006). If gender stereotypes
are also present in female managers, they may not ac-
tively sympathize with and support their female subordi-
nates or actively pursue gender equality enhancing
policies in their organization. Instead, if female manag-
ers have and act on negative stereotypes about working
women, this may harm the earnings of their female sub-
ordinates. These arguments lead to the following expli-
cation of the ‘strong’ version of the cogs in the machine
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c: Women’s earnings are negatively related
to the proportion of female managers in an organiza-
tion, men’s earnings are positively related to the propor-
tion of female managers in an organization
Hypothesis 2c: Women’s earnings are positively related
to having a male manager compared to a female man-
ager, men’s earnings are positively related to having a fe-
male manager compared to a male manager
Data and Measurements
Data
To test our hypotheses, we employ data from the ESWS
(van der Lippe et al., 2016). The ESWS data contain in-
formation on organizations from nine European coun-
tries: Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, and
Hungary.1 Within each country, organizations with 20–
49 employees, 100–250 employees, and >250 employ-
ees and from the following six sectors were selected:
manufacturing, healthcare, higher education, transport,
financial services, and telecommunication. For each
sampling cell (size-sector) a random sample of organiza-
tions was drawn from a national business list or, when
such a list was not available, business lists of national
branch organizations were used. If response rates were
insufficient within a sector-size category, a matching
strategy was applied in which organizations that did not
wish to cooperate were replaced by a similar organiza-
tion. Within-organization response rates are 61% for
employees (ranging between 45% in Germany and 94%
in Bulgaria), 81% for department managers (ranging be-
tween 71% in Finland and 96% in Bulgaria) and 100%
for HR managers. When organizational representatives
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(often the Human Resource manager or the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO)) agreed to participate, employees and
their department-managers were requested to fill in a
questionnaire. Each type of respondent received a different
questionnaire. Organizations could choose whether they
wanted to use the online or paper questionnaire. Within
each organization, at least two departments that repre-
sented the core activity of the organization (e.g., nurses
in a hospital) and one department that had other pri-
mary tasks (e.g., finances, communication) were
approached. On average, 3.3 departments per organiza-
tion were surveyed. Within departments, all workers
were approached to participate.2 The ESWS data thus
have a three level structure: employees are nested in
departments, which are nested in organizations. For
9.601 employees, we have information from their de-
partment managers (721) and organizational representa-
tives (246). We selected respondents aged 18 and older
working in organizations that employed both women
and men. This left us with 9.267 employees working for
706 department managers in 238 organizations.
Measurements
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is employees’ net hourly income
in Euros. Employees were asked: ‘What are your net
monthly earnings from your main job at this organiza-
tion? Please refer to your average earnings in recent
months’. A definition of earnings was added: ‘what you
have left every month after deducting national and local
taxes and compulsory national insurance contributions’.
In case respondents did not answer this question, they
were asked to choose one of 21 income categories; catego-
ries differed between countries.3 We took the median of
the income category and all currencies were converted to
Euros. To calculate the hourly income of respondents,
respondents’ earnings were divided by the hours they
were contracted for their organization. If this information
was missing, we used respondents’ self-reported hours ac-
tually worked for the organization. We dealt with extreme
values by converting the original value to its natural log.
Independent variables
Employee questionnaire. The main variable of interest
on the employee level is female, on which men score a 0
and women score a 1. As control variables, we first in-
clude the age of employees and the quadratic term age2
since we expect a non-linear effect of age. We also con-
trol for employees’ educational level. Employees were
asked: What is the highest level of education that you
have completed? There were 8 main categories: not
completed primary education (0), primary education or
first stage of basic education (1), lower level secondary
education or second stage of basic education (2), upper
secondary education (3), post-secondary, non-tertiary
education (4), first stage of tertiary education (bachelor)
(5), second stage of tertiary education (master) (6), and
doctoral degree (7). We include this variable linearly in
the analyses; including it categorical in the analyses did
not affect the results. We control for occupational segre-
gation by including employees’ ISCO code based on the
question: ‘What is your occupation? Please give a full
description of your occupation, for example nurse at the
intensive care, cashier at the bakery counter.’ We include
ISCO codes on the one-digit level and construct a separate
category for missing values (288 cases). The variable ten-
ure captures the years employees worked for the organ-
ization. Last, we control for whether employees live with
a partner (0/1) and whether the employee has dependent
children. Employees with children below 18, or with chil-
dren living at home score a 1, others score 0.
Department manager questionnaire. On the department
level we look at whether the department manager is fe-
male (1) or male (0). Due to the hierarchal structure of
the ESWS data, we know which employees are super-
vised by which department manager. This variable
allows us to test whether earnings of female and male
employees are affected by having a female or male de-
partment manager.
Organizational questionnaire. In most organizations, the
HR-manager or CEO filled in the organizational ques-
tionnaire. To establish the percentage of female managers
in the organization, the organizational representative was
asked what percentage of managers in their organization
are female. In case they did not know the precise figure,
they were asked to estimate. As controls on the organiza-
tional level, we first include organizational size. HR-
managers were asked: ‘How many employees are there in
the organization?’. We calculated the natural log of this
variable. We also control for the percentage of female
employees. HR-managers were asked what percentage of
the employees in their organization was female.
Originally, this variable was coded on a 9-point scale
from there are no female employees (1) to all employees
are female (9). We converted this variable into a linear
scale by recoding these values into 0% and 100% and
taking the median of categories in between.
We removed respondents with missing values from
our dataset. Most missing values were on employees’
hourly wage (969). Our final dataset consists of 7.697
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respondents, 669 departments, and 231 organizations.
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.
Analyses
Methods
We perform three level linear regression models in
which the intercept and the effect of female are allowed
to vary over departments and organizations (Schmidt-
Catran and Fairbrother, 2016).4 Country and sector
dummy variables are included in the models (except for
model 0 and 1) to control for respondents’ nesting in
countries and sectors. The sector ‘transport’ and the
country ‘Hungary’ are the reference categories.5 To rep-
licate previous organizational-level studies, we do not
control for having a female manager when estimating
the effect of the proportion of female managers in the
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Employee variables
Hourly wage (natural log) 0 5.521 2.065 0.830
Female 0 1 0.561 0.496
Age 18 74 42.013 10.936
Age2 324 5476 1884.695 938.502
Living with partner 0 1 0.733 0.443
Dependent children 0 1 0.495 0.500
Educational attainment 1 8 5.386 1.427
Tenure (years working for organization) 0.083 55 10.576 9.805
ISCO 1: managers 0 1 0.061 0.239
ISCO 2: professionals 0 1 0.300 0.458
ISCO 3: technicians and associate professionals 0 1 0.282 0.450
ISCO 4: clerical support workers 0 1 0.158 0.365
ISCO 5: services and sales workers 0 1 0.045 0.208
ISCO 6: skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 0 1 0.000 0.020
ISCO 7: craft and related trades workers 0 1 0.039 0.194
ISCO 8: plant and machine operators and assemblers 0 1 0.045 0.207
ISCO 9: elementary occupations 0 1 0.018 0.133
ISCO: missing 0 1 0.051 0.221
Department variables
Female manager 0 1 0.383 0.486
Organizational variables
Proportion female managers 0 1 0.362 0.250
Proportion female employees 2 9 0.497 0.242
Number of employees (natural log) 2.197 9.210 5.589 1.432
Sector: manufacturing 0 1 0.251 0.433
Sector: healthcare 0 1 0.242 0.428
Sector: higher education 0 1 0.156 0.363
Sector: transport 0 1 0.121 0.327
Sector: financial services 0 1 0.136 0.343
Sector: telecommunication 0 1 0.094 0.292
Country: United Kingdom 0 1 0.070 0.256
Country: Germany 0 1 0.093 0.291
Country: Finland 0 1 0.072 0.259
Country: Sweden 0 1 0.096 0.294
Country: the Netherlands 0 1 0.226 0.418
Country: Portugal 0 1 0.108 0.310
Country: Spain 0 1 0.077 0.266
Country: Hungary 0 1 0.126 0.332
Country: Bulgaria 0 1 0.131 0.338
Source: ESWS. N¼7.697 respondents, 669 departments, 231 organizations.
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organization in model 2 and 3, but we do control for the
proportion of female managers when estimating the ef-
fect of having a female manager in model 4 and 5
(Abendroth et al., 2017). Appendix A shows model 6
per country and includes a discussion of the country-
specific results. Appendix B shows model 6 per sector.
Results
The null-model in Table 2 shows considerable variation
of employees’ earnings between departments and organ-
izations, justifying a multilevel approach.6 The intra-
class correlation is 11% on the department level and
34% on the organizational level. Model 1 shows that
there exists a considerable and significant gender gap in
earnings. Men’s average hourly wage, indicated by the
intercept, is 8.33e (b ¼ e^2.120). Women in our sample
earn on average 7.74e per hour (b¼ e^(2.120–0.074),
which is .59e, or 7%, less than men. Considering a
40 hour workweek, the gender gap in earnings is about
104e per month. Note that this figure is only adjusted
for working hours and not for sector, country, educa-
tional attainment, job status and other organizational,
or individual control variables.
In models 2 and 3, we test whether the proportion of
female managers in an organization affects the earnings
of female and male employees. The main effect of pro-
portion of female managers indicates the effect for men
(who score 0 on female), its interaction with female indi-
cates the difference in the effect between women and
men. Both the main effect of proportion of female man-
agers and its cross-level interaction with female are not
statistically significant in model 2 (P¼ 0.918 and P ¼
0.292). In model 3 control variables are added; the main
and interaction effects of proportion of female managers
stay largely the same. Individual control variables be-
have as one would expect; older, higher educated, more
experienced employees and employees with children
have a relatively higher wage. We conclude that both
women’s and men’s earnings are not affected by work-
ing in an organization with a high share of female man-
agers, which is in line with the weak version of the
women as cogs in the machine argument and supports
hypothesis 1 b. So, the share of women in managerial
positions does not contribute to gender equality in earn-
ings in an organization.
Models 4 and 5 show whether female and male
employees’ earnings are affected by having a female
manager. The interaction effect of female manager with
female in model 2 shows to what extent the effect of
having a female manager differs between female and
male employees. Both the main effect of having a female
manager and its interaction with female do not reach
statistical significance in model 4 and this does not
change when control variables are added in model 5. As
a result, we conclude that women’s and men’s wages are
not differently affected by the sex of their manager. This
result is in accordance with hypothesis 2 b, again sup-
porting the weak version of the women as cogs in the
machine hypothesis. So, female managers do not reduce
gender inequality in earnings in their organization by
enhancing the earnings of their female subordinates. In
model 6, we include both interactions and all individual
and organizational control variables to control the inter-
action effects for each other’s influence. Like previous
models, model 6 shows that women’s and men’s earn-
ings are not affected by the proportion of female manag-
ers in an organization, nor by having a female manager
themselves.7
Conclusions
This study contributes to the growing body of literature
on the significance of women’s representation in man-
agerial positions. The first goal of this study was to as-
sess whether women’s and men’s earnings are affected
by the proportion of female managers in their organiza-
tion. In order to provide more insight in the on the
ground actions of female managers, our second goal was
to test whether women’s and men’s earnings are affected
by being supervised by a female manager. Unique three-
level manager-employee linked data from the ESWS
allowed us, as one of the first, to study whether female
managers enhance gender wage equality in organiza-
tions by enhancing the earnings of their direct female
subordinates (Huffman, 2016). We were the first to as-
sess this for a wide variety of organizations, sectors and
countries.
Our results showed that women’s and men’s earnings
are not affected by the share of female managers in their
organization, nor by being supervised by a female man-
ager themselves. Accordingly, we conclude that women
in management positions do not make a substantial con-
tribution to gender equality in earnings in organizations.
This result is in line with the weak version of the female
managers as cogs in the machine hypothesis that
assumed no link between women’s and men’s earnings
and the sex of (their) managers. We theorized that fe-
male managers are often situated in low-level manage-
ment where they do not have enough power to influence
organizational processes and the careers and earnings of
their direct subordinates. In this, our study contrasts
previous organizational-level studies but it is in
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accordance with previous research that assessed direct
manager-employee links.
Our findings differ from previous organizational-
level studies that established higher earnings for women
working in organizations with a high share of female
managers (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Cardoso and
Winter-Ebmer, 2010). There are a few possible explana-
tions as to why we found support for the weak version
of the cogs in the machine hypothesis whereas previous
organizational-level studies supported the women as
change agents hypothesis. These explanations mostly re-
late to the sample of employees, managers, and organi-
zations we employed. First, Cohen and Huffman (2007)
found that the positive association between the share of
women in management and women’s earnings was al-
most exclusively driven by women in high status man-
agerial positions. Our robustness analyses did not show
variation in results between higher or lower status man-
agers, but more direct information on, for example,
managers’ responsibilities may provide a clearer picture
in this regard. In addition, other organizational-level
studies also found equalizing effects of low level manag-
ers (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003) or managers of employ-
ees low in the organizational hierarchy (Abraham,
2017), so this is likely not the sole explanation for the
difference in findings. Second, the great majority of pre-
vious organizational-level studies focused on the United
States and/or a specific subset of organizations (Baron
et al., 1991; Cohen and Huffman, 2007). The fact that
we, as one of the very few European studies, did not find
an effect of the proportion of female managers on the
gender gap in earnings and Abendroth et al. (2017)
found it only for low qualified jobs in Germany could
indicate that results are influenced by contextual charac-
teristics that differ between Europe and the United
States. An important contribution of our study is that
we analyzed organizations from different sizes, sectors,
and European countries enabling us to test our hypothe-
ses in a wide range of contexts. The highly similar rela-
tionships we found in all countries and sectors and for
different types of employees and organizations give little
indication as to how contextual characteristics might af-
fect the influence female managers have on gender in-
equality in organizations. Still, social contexts of
employees, managers, and organizations likely affect the
extent to which female managers function as change
agents. Gender stereotypes in national and organization-
al cultures, for example, may influence incentives of
women to strive for high paid positions but also of
organizations to actively pursue gender equality in wage
among their employees. Institutional factors, such as the
extent to which markets and political forces determine
wages, differ greatly between Europe and the United
States and affect the extent to which managers exert in-
fluence over employees’ wages and therefore their
opportunities to influence gender wage inequality. Only
Maume and Ruppanner (2015) have studied the inter-
play between institutional contexts and the influence of
female managers on the gender gap in earnings; their
study showed that state liberalism did not affect the ex-
tent to which female managers functioned as change
agents. Still, they hold that: ‘it is not necessarily whether
women in power reduce gender inequality, but how and
in what contexts do female leaders ameliorate gender in-
equality among subordinates.’(Maume and Ruppanner,
2015: p. 136). Unfortunately, the sample of countries
and sectors in the ESWS is too limited to test cross-level
interactions between contextual characteristics and the
influence of female managers on the gender gap in earn-
ings. Future research should, however, find a task in
interacting institutional and cultural contextual charac-
teristics with mangers’ sex and the earnings of female
and male employees. A last explanation for the differ-
ence in findings is that the sample of organizations in
the ESWS data is not representative for all organizations
in the participating countries. Although the wide variety
of organizations and countries is a strength of the data
we employed, the low number of organizations per
country affects the generalizability of our results.
Additionally, part of the ESWS data is collected using
convenience sampling and, although this method is not
uncommon in management studies, this could also affect
also the generalizability of our results (Johansen and
Zhu, 2017).
Our finding that women do not benefit in terms of
earnings from having a female manager is in line with
previous individual-level studies (Maume and
Ruppanner, 2015; Abendroth et al., 2017). A first logic-
al follow up question is of course whether female man-
agers benefit their female subordinates in other ways
than in terms of earnings. There are reasons to suspect
that female managers are more understanding of work-
family conflicts of female subordinates than male man-
agers, which might lead to less conflict or more job satis-
faction when women have a female manager (Linehan
and Walsh, 2000). Another question that remains is
whether female managers lack the motivation or the
power to improve the earnings of their female subordi-
nates. The ESWS provided only information on depart-
ment managers and did not include information on the
executive power of these managers. Hence, we could not
assess in depth whether female managers had—or felt to
be having—the power to improve the earnings of their
female subordinates. Robustness checks in which we
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ranked department managers (see endnote 6) however
showed no effect of high-ranked female managers. In
addition, Srivastava and Sherman (2015) showed that
even high status female managers do not improve the
earnings of their female subordinates. This seems to in-
dicate that a motivation of female managers to act as
change agents is lacking, which relates to queen bee
arguments (Derks et al., 2016). However, we also know
that the extent to which female managers are motivated
to support other women is influenced by the organiza-
tional culture in which they work. Derks et al. (2011)
concluded that female managers do not necessarily have
the tendency to compete with and distance themselves
from other women (i.e., act as queen bees), but do so if
and when they feel it is a way to rise on the organiza-
tional ladder, i.e., in organizations with strong mascu-
line cultures. So, a task for future research lies not only
in examining in which contexts female managers act as
change agents, but also in exposing the mechanisms be-
hind why female managers are not motivated and able
to significantly contribute to gender equality in their
organization.
Although gender gaps in earnings have decreased
over time, they are persistent in all countries and almost
all types of organizations (Blau, 2016). Our study indi-
cates that gender inequality in organizations is not auto-
matically tackled by increasing the number of women in
managerial positions. Since gender gaps in earnings are
so persistent, it is unlikely that one organizational factor
solely greatly contributes to gender equality in organiza-
tions. A growing body of literature points to an interplay
of organizational culture, characteristics of organiza-
tional stakeholders and larger societal and institutional
contexts in which they operate (Watts, 2009; Derks
et al., 2011; Johansen and Zhu, 2017). So, if organiza-
tions want to reduce existing inequalities between
women and men, but possibly also between other major-
ity and minority groups, it is likely they have to take
measures on different levels in their organization. This
could refer to measures that stimulate an organizational
climate in which women are motivated to and can act as
change agents, but also policies that independently of fe-
male managers tackle gender inequalities on various lev-
els in the organization. An example could be specific
types of formalization policies that have been shown to
be effective in reducing inequalities between employees
from majority and minority groups (Dobbin et al.,
2015). However, since managers decide on the imple-
mentation of these measures, an important focus should
remain on how the distribution of power in organization
relates to inequalities among employees.
Notes
1 The term organization refers to an organization but
sometimes, in the case of multi-site companies or
organizations, to the local unit (the establishment).
2 In a few organizations, only the participation of a
sample of workers was supported.
3 The exact question to determine the income category
of respondents was: “If you don’t know exactly
what your net monthly earnings are, perhaps you
can provide the approximate range. Which category
best describes your net monthly earnings from your
main job at this organization? If you don’t know the
exact category, please give an estimate.” Contract
hours were measured as follows: “How many hours
a week are you contracted to work for this organiza-
tion? Exclude any paid or unpaid overtime.” For
respondents that did not fill in that question we used
their answer on the following question: “How many
hours a week do you actually work for this organiza-
tion? Include paid or unpaid overtime, but not your
commuting time.” Results do not differ when only
respondents who filled in their actual income are
included in the analyses.
4 Robustness analyses with organization/department
fixed-effects analyses showed highly similar results
and lead to identical conclusions.
5 Results do not differ when other reference categories
of sector and country are taken. Sector correlates
with the percentage of female employees and female
managers. Estimates stay largely the same when sec-
tor dummies are excluded from the models.
6 Recent studies indicated that it is important to look
at within organizational variation with regards to
effects of the proportion of female managers and
having a female manager (Abendroth et al., 2017;
Abraham, 2017). To this end, we examined vari-
ation between high and low-educated employees and
large and small organizations. Results did not show
statistically significant effects for any of these sub-
groups. We also tested whether results differed when
controlling for the status of the manager, or when
differentiating between high and low-status manag-
ers based on the managers’ educational level and in-
come (Cohen and Huffman, 2007), the time she/he
has been managing the department, the number of
employees in the department and the average ISEI
score of the manager’s employees. This did not ap-
pear to be the case (results available upon request).
Unfortunately, the ESWS does not provide more spe-
cific data to determine managers’ status, nor does it
has information on respondents’ ethnicity so we
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could not investigate its influence on the associations
we examined. In addition, we checked whether the
effect of having dependent children on earnings dif-
fered between female and male employees, and
whether mothers benefited more from having a fe-
male manager than others (i.e. fathers or employees
without children). Results showed no variation be-
tween these subgroups. We checked for influential
cases using the Jack-knife procedure. When remov-
ing Spain or Portugal from the analyses, the cross-
level interaction of the proportion female managers
with female becomes significant at the 0.1 level.
When removing Sweden from the analysis, the inter-
action of having a female manager and female
becomes significant at the 0.1 level. We do not con-
sider these estimates reliable enough to draw solid
conclusions from and therefore do not discuss them
in the main text. Finally, since there exists variation
in income levels between countries we performed ro-
bustness checks in which we adjusted income
according to price levels in the different countries
(Eurostat, 2017). Results stay virtually the same
when considering this adjusted measurement of
income.
7 The three-way interaction between female, female
manager and proportion female managers is not stat-
istically significant.
Acknowledgements
We thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments on
earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Funding
This research is funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of
Arts and Sciences (reference UPS/MW/3929).
References
Abendroth, A.-K. and den Dulk, L. (2011). Support for the
work-life balance in Europe: the impact of state, workplace
and family support on work-life balance satisfaction. Work,
Employment and Society, 25, 234–256.
Abendroth, A. K. et al. (2017). Women at work: women’s access
to power and the gender earnings gap. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 70, 190–222.
Abraham, M. (2017). Pay formalization revisited: considering
the effects of manager gender and discretion on closing the
gender wage gap. Academy of Management Journal, 60,
29–54.
Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes. Gender &Society, 20,
441–464.
Baron, J. N., Mittman, B. S. and Newman, A. E. (1991). Targets
of opportunity: organizational and environmental determi-
nants of gender integration within the California civil service,
1979-1985. American Journal of Sociology, 96, 1362–1401.
Blau, F. (2016). Gender, inequality, and Wages. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Butts, M. M., Casper, W. J. and Yang, T. S. (2013). How im-
portant are work–family support policies? A meta-analytic in-
vestigation of their effects on employee outcomes. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 98, 1–25.
Bygren, M. and Ga¨hler, M. (2012). Family formation and men’s
and women’s attainment of workplace authority. Social
Forces, 90, 795–816.
Cardoso, A. R. and Winter-Ebmer, R. (2010). Female-led firms
and gender wage policies. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 64, 143–163.
Castilla, E. J. (2011). Bringing managers back in: managerial
influences on workplace inequality. American Sociological
Review, 76, 667–694.
Cha, Y. and Weeden, K. A. (2014). Overwork and the slow con-
vergence in the gender gap in wages. American Sociological
Review, 79, 457–484.
Charles, M. and Grusky, D. B. (2004). Occupational Ghettos:
The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men. Stanford
University Press.
Cohen, P. N. and Huffman, M. L. (2007). Working for the
woman? Female managers and the gender wage gap.
American Sociological Review, 72, 681–704.
Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T. and Glick, P. (2004). When profes-
sionals become mothers, warmth doesn’t cut the ice. Journal
of Social Issues, 60, 701–718.
Derks, B. et al. (2011). Do sexist organizational cultures create
the Queen Bee? The British Journal of Social Psychology/The
British Psychological Society, 50, 519–535.
Derks, B., Van Laar, C. and Ellemers, N. (2016). The queen bee
phenomenon: why women leaders distance themselves from
junior women. Leadership Quarterly, 27, 456–469.
Dobbin, F., Kim, S. and Kalev, A. (2011). You can’t always get
what you need. American Sociological Review, 76, 386–411.
Dobbin, F., Schrage, D. and Kalev, A. (2015). Rage against the
Iron Cage. American Sociological Review, 80, 1014–1044.
Ehrich, L. C. and Kimber, M. (2015). The purpose and place of
mentoring for women managers in organisations: an austra-
lian perspective. In Connerley, M. L. and Wu, J. (Eds.),
Handbook on Well-Being of Working Women. Dordrecht:
Springer, pp. 225–242.
Elliott, J. R. and Smith, R. A. (2004). Race, gender, and work-
place power. American Sociological Review, 69, 365–386.
Ely, R. J. (1995). The power in demography: women’s social
constructions of gender identity at work. The Acadamy of
Management Journal, 38, 589–634.
England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: uneven and stalled.
Gender & Society, 24, 149–166.
Eurostat. (2017). Purchasing power parities (PPPs), price level in-
dices and real expenditures for ESA 2010 aggregates, available
from: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do? data
set¼prc_ppp_ind&lang¼en [accessed February 2018]
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 35, No. 3 327
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/35/3/316/5470943 by guest on 17 April 2020
Halpert, J. A., Wilson, M. L. and Hickman, J. L. (1993).
Pregnancy as a source of bias in performance appraisals.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 14, 649–663.
Heilman, M. E. (2012). Gender stereotypes and workplace bias.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 32, 113–135.
Huffman, M. L. (2013). Organizations, managers, and wage in-
equality. Sex Roles, 68, 216–222.
Huffman, M. L. (2016). Does the presence of women in management
impact gender inequality? In Connerley, M. L. and Wu, J. (Eds.),
Handbook on Well-Being of Working Women. Dordrecht:
Springer Netherlands, pp. 175–187.
Hultin, M. and Szulkin, R. (2003). Mechanisms of inequality: un-
equal access to organizational power and the gender wage
mechanisms of inequality unequal access to organizational
power and the gender wage gap. Source: European Sociological
Review European Sociological Review, 19, 143–159.
Jacobs, J. A. (1992). Women’s entry into management: trends in
earnings, authority, and values among salaries managers.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 282–301.
Johansen, M. and Zhu, L. (2017). Who values diversity?
Comparing the effect of manager gender across the public, pri-
vate, and nonprofit sectors. The American Review of Public
Administration, 47, 797–809. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0275074016634201
Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation.
New York: BasicBooks.
Kurtulus, F. A. and Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (2012). Do female
top managers help women to advance? A panel study using
EEO-1 records. The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 639, 173–197.
Linehan, M. and Walsh, J. S. (2000). Work-family conflict and
the senior female international manager. British Journal of
Management, 11, 49–58.
Lyness, K. S. and Heilman, M. E. (2006). When fit is fundamen-
tal: performance evaluations and promotions of upper-level
female and male managers. Journal of Applied Psychology,
91, 777–785.
Maume, D. J. (2011). Meet the new boss. . . Same as the old
boss? Female supervisors and subordinate career prospects.
Social Science Research, 40, 287–298.
Maume, D. J. and Ruppanner, L. (2015). State liberalism, fe-
male supervisors, and the gender wage gap. Social Science
Research, 50, 126–138.
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds
of a feather: homophily in social networks. Annual Review of
Sociology, 27, 415–444.
Penner, A. M., Toro-Tulla, H. J. and Huffman, M. L. (2012).
Do women managers ameliorate gender differences in wages?
Evidence from a large. Source: Sociological Perspectives, 55,
365–381.
Reskin, B. F. (2000). The proximate causes of employment dis-
crimination. Contemporary Sociology, 29, 319.
Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Gender, status, and leadership. Journal
of Social Issues, 57, 637–655. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-
4537.00233
Schmidt-Catran, A. W. and Fairbrother, M. (2016). The random
effects in multilevel models: getting them wrong and getting
them right. European Sociological Review, 32, 23–38.
Shenhav, Y. and Haberfeld, Y. (1992). Organizational demog-
raphy and inequality. Social Forces, 71, 123–143.
Smith, R. A. (2002). Race, gender, and authority in the work-
place: theory and research. Annual Review of Sociology, 28,
509–542.
Srivastava, S. B. and Sherman, E. L. (2015). Agents of change or
cogs in the machine? Re-examining the influence of female
managers on the gender wage gap. American Journal of
Sociology, 120, 1778–1808.
van der Lippe, T. et al. (2016). European Sustainable Workforce
Survey [ESWS]. Utrecht: Utrecht University.
Watts, J. H. (2009). Leaders of men: women “managing” in con-
struction. Work, Employment and Society, 23, 512–530.
Margriet van Hek is a postdoctoral researcher in the
Department of Sociology/ICS, Radboud University in
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Her main research interests
comprise social stratification, gender issues, educational
sociology, and cultural tastes and lifestyles.
Tanja van der Lippe is Professor of Sociology at Utrecht
University, head of the Department of Sociology and re-
search director at ICS Utrecht. Her research interests are
in the area of work–family linkages in Dutch and other
societies, for which she has received a number of large-
scale grants from Dutch and European Science
Foundations. She is an elected member of the European
Academy of Sociology (2010), the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (2014), and the Royal
Holland Society of Sciences and Humanities (2013). She
has published extensively on work and care of men and
women in European countries.
328 European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 35, No. 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/35/3/316/5470943 by guest on 17 April 2020
Appendix A
Country-Specific Analyses
Table A.1.Model 6 separately for: Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
Finland Sweden Germany The Netherlands United Kingdom
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 2.451*** 0.326 2.254*** 0.513 1.404*** 0.244 1.844*** 0.139 2.315*** 0.338
Employee variables
Female 0.044 0.063 0.019 0.125 0.120** 0.045 0.091** 0.028 0.247* 0.097
Age 0.013 0.011 0.033 0.021 0.037*** 0.007 0.024*** 0.004 0.031** 0.011
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000
Educational level 0.040** 0.015 0.023 0.022 0.055*** 0.008 0.039*** 0.006 0.029* 0.014
Partner 0.007 0.033 0.015 0.060 0.069** 0.024 0.006 0.013 0.046 0.042
Dependent children 0.053 0.031 0.044 0.061 0.037 0.023 0.027* 0.013 0.004 0.040
Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003
Department variables
Female manager 0.105 0.066 0.179 0.142 0.018 0.050 0.015 0.037 0.077 0.071
Organizational variables
Proportion female managers 0.373 0.223 0.015 0.349 0.386 0.170 0.053 0.199 0.359 0.355
Proportion female employees 0.739* 0.299 0.072 0.219 0.075 0.251 0.018 0.146 1.046* 0.408
Number of employees (natural log) 0.039 0.045 0.026 0.032 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.017 0.033 0.035
Interactions
Proportion female managers*female 0.026 0.126 0.139 0.367 0.087 0.086 0.201 0.111 0.375 0.277
Female manager*female 0.034 0.072 0.234 0.162 0.013 0.055 0.009 0.042 0.077 0.082
Variance statistics
Organization variance 0.099 0.000 0.119 0.084 0.092
Department variance 0.030 0.263 0.083 0.088 0.072
Employee variance 0.304 0.646 0.263 0.219 0.388
Slope female over organizations 0.032 0.000 0.048 0.030 0.069
Slope female variance over departments 0.001 0.246 0.001 0.098 0.000
Note: ISCO codes are included but not shown in this table. In Sweden ISCO 6 and 9 is not available, in the UK the healthcare sector is not available.
Source: ESWS.
P < 0.1.
*P < 0.05.
**P<0.01.
***P<0.001.
N1Finland¼ 557; N1Sweden¼ 738; N1Germany¼718; N1The Netherlands¼1,741; N1UK¼541.
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Discussion of Country-specific Analyses
Appendix A provides model 6 specified for each country.
Mostly, country analyses display the same picture as
analyses in which all countries are combined: women’s
and men’s earnings are not differently affected by the
proportion of female managers in their organization,
nor by having a female manager themselves. There are,
however, some exceptions. In the Netherlands, working
in an organization with a high proportion of female
managers is more positively related to women’s earnings
than to men’s (b ¼ 0.201). In Portugal and Hungary,
women’s earnings are more negatively affected by
having a female manager than men’s (b ¼ 0.160 and b
¼ 0.191).
Since the number of organizations per country is lim-
ited we need to be cautious with the interpretation of
our country-specific results. Yet, our findings for the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Hungary seem to be in line
with findings of previous organizational-level and
individual-level studies (Cohen and Huffman, 2007;
Abendroth et al., 2017). Whereas in the Netherlands we
find positive effects of the proportion of female manag-
ers in an organization for women’s earnings, in Portugal
and Hungary we see that women’s earnings are lower
when they have a female manager.
Table A.2.Model 6 separately for: Portugal, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria.
Portugal Spain Hungary Bulgaria
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 0.096 0.510 1.362** 0.414 0443 0.395 0.152 0.342
Employee variables
Female 0.022 0.085 0.034 0.085 0.036 0.073 0.203* 0.081
Age 0.031 0.019 0.031 0.018 0.031** 0.012 0.026* 0.011
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
Educational level 0.197*** 0.023 0.041** 0.015 0.107*** 0.015 0.087*** 0.013
Partner 0.090* 0.045 0.055 0.045 0.023 0.034 0.010 0.036
Dependent children 0.059 0.042 0.056 0.043 0.023 0.035 0.055 0.034
Tenure 0.006 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002
Department variables
Female manager 0.061 0.075 0.008 0.075 0.080 0.064 0.034 0.079
Organizational variables
Proportion female managers 0.494 0.397 0.462 0.273 0.036 0.409 0.280 0.195
Proportion female employees 0.091 0.326 0.426 0.300 0.402 0.489 0.013 0.225
Number of employees (natural log) 0.039 0.041 0.021 0.023 0.009 0.035 0.015 0.039
Interactions
Proportion female managers*female 0.163 0.234 0.155 0.194 0.038 0.119 0.223 0.159
Female manager*female 0.160 0.089 0.059 0.081 0.191** 0.072 0.007 0.077
Variance statistics
Organization variance 0.245 0.001 0.150 0.141
Department variance 0.035 0.119 0.058 0.176
Employee variance 0.506 0.404 0.458 0.459
Slope female over organizations 0.092 0.000 0.004 0.073
Slope female variance over departments 0.010 0.060 0.003 0.000
Note: ISCO codes are included but not shown in this table. In Portugal, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria ISCO 6 is not available.
Source: ESWS.
P < 0.1.
*P < 0.05.
**P<0.01.
***P<0.001.
N1Portugal¼830; N1Spain¼ 592; N1Hungary¼971; N1Bulgaria¼1, 009.
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